Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-767nl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-11T12:32:03.438Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

11 - Bribes and gifts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Susan Rose-Ackerman
Affiliation:
Yale University
Avner Ben-Ner
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
Louis Putterman
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
Get access

Summary

One person's bribe is another's gift. When disparaging a monetary quid pro quo, critics call it a bribe, whatever its legal status. Bribes are bad, and gifts are good. Being too mercenary is suspect, but living off the generosity of others is also disreputable. Into this set of rough and ready judgments comes the cheerfully philistine economist to argue that bribes are good and gifts are payments for expected benefits. Corrupt officials are efficient, and pure altruism does not exist.

But such reductionism ignores the moral force of labels. If a payment is viewed as an immoral bribe, many people will refuse to pay or accept one even if someone explains to them that the transaction is efficient and fair. Conversely, if a payment is described as a gift, people who try to be good and generous may be eager to contribute even if the consequences are pernicious.

Values are not, however, immutable. Society delimits the boundaries between unacceptable bribes and acceptable gifts and prices. It does this with legal strictures and social norms. The state can signal the seriousness of an infraction by the level of law enforcement and the size of the penalties. People are deterred from bribery, not just by the fear of being caught, but also by the state's clear signal that such behavior is unacceptable. Similarly, gifts can be encouraged through subsidy programs and tax breaks. People are encouraged to give not only because of the subsidy itself, but also because the subsidy signals that giving is a good thing to do.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×