Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Route to War, 1738–1739
- 2 Mobilisation and the Outbreak of War, June–October 1739
- 3 The Opening Moves, October 1739–January 1741
- 4 The Widening War and the Fall of Sir Robert Walpole, January 1741– February 1742
- 5 Shifting Focus, the Growth of the Continental Commitment, February–December 1742
- 6 The Continental Commitment, January 1743–February 1744
- 7 War with France and Crisis of the Worms Policy, February 1744–December 1744
- 8 Rebellion and the End of the Flanders Policy, January–December 1745
- 9 Europe and America: the Critical Balance, January–December 1746
- 10 Newcastle’s War: the End in Europe and America, January 1747–October 1748
- 11 Conclusion: The Peace and British Naval Power
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Europe and America: the Critical Balance, January–December 1746
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Route to War, 1738–1739
- 2 Mobilisation and the Outbreak of War, June–October 1739
- 3 The Opening Moves, October 1739–January 1741
- 4 The Widening War and the Fall of Sir Robert Walpole, January 1741– February 1742
- 5 Shifting Focus, the Growth of the Continental Commitment, February–December 1742
- 6 The Continental Commitment, January 1743–February 1744
- 7 War with France and Crisis of the Worms Policy, February 1744–December 1744
- 8 Rebellion and the End of the Flanders Policy, January–December 1745
- 9 Europe and America: the Critical Balance, January–December 1746
- 10 Newcastle’s War: the End in Europe and America, January 1747–October 1748
- 11 Conclusion: The Peace and British Naval Power
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In mid-December 1745, two Dutch representatives, Boetslaer and Hop, arrived in London with a resolution from the States General. They proposed that the allies put a force of 95,000 into the field for the next campaign, and demanded to know what Britain would contribute to the common defence of Flanders. The Dutch had not yet declared war on France, nor had they been directly attacked at home or had their maritime commerce seriously disrupted. Thus, British ministers reasoned, a clear message had to be given to these allies. An army of 95,000 should be assembled, but no direct help could be expected from Britain while the rebellion was still alive. The Dutch should declare war on France and provide 40,000 troops. The Austrians should provide 30,000. The King would continue to supply 8,000 Hanoverians in Flanders and the 6,000 Hessians would be sent back there as soon as the rebellion was over. Britain would join the Dutch in providing a subsidy for 10,000 Saxons. This was very much in line with Cobham's views, who ‘owned (it) was much more reasonable than he imagined we could have made it, and that, if we would support the continent at all, it could not be in a better or cheaper manner’. He agreed to come into government with the Pelhams on condition that Pitt became Secretary at War, William, Viscount Barrington joined the Admiralty and James Grenville had a post of £1,000 a year.
George II agreed to all these demands, except the appointment of Pitt. He accepted that the continental war could not be won without a fundamental shift in Dutch or Austrian commitment to it. The Speech from the Throne, opening Parliament on 14 January, echoed the response to the Dutch representatives. He acknowledged that the Anglo-Dutch alliance was essential to containing French ambition and that he would do ‘the utmost of my power, according to the circumstances of my own dominions’. There was no mention of troops returning to Flanders. Support would concentrate on helping the Dutch to augment their own forces. Most importantly, the role of the navy was stressed.
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- Information
- The Emergence of Britain's Global Naval SupremacyThe War of 1739-1748, pp. 271 - 297Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2010