Mobilisation and Diplomacy

On the evening of 3 June, the die had been cast and Britain was committed to hostilities with Spain. Over the following days the orders went out from the secretaries of state's offices for preparations to begin. Bringing the fleet up to operational standard was not an easy process in the eighteenth century. One of the vital resources for mobilising the fleet was manpower. The navy drew its seamen from the maritime communities of the kingdom as and when it needed them. However, in early summer, with maritime commerce at its annual peak of activity, there were few unemployed seamen lingering ashore. A further problem was that while the wages of seamen in the Royal Navy were fixed, those in merchant service fluctuated with the market conditions. Generally, merchant wages were higher than those in the navy, and the sudden additional demand for seamen from the Royal Navy, would, inevitably, place an upward pressure on wage rates, further widening the pay gap between the navy and the merchants. This was well understood and the state possessed legal instruments of coercion and encouragement to meet such emergencies as this. On the 5 June the Admiralty issued press warrants to naval officers to begin manning the fleet. Shortly afterwards, on the 11 June, orders were sent to all ships’ masters prohibiting them from releasing men from the service until further notice. On the 15 June a proclamation was issued providing an additional bounty to encourage seamen to enlist freely in the navy. On the following day, the Privy Council approved an Admiralty request for an embargo on all shipping leaving British ports until the fleet was manned. The rapid response of the government in taking these measures was not just a recognition of the time it would take, but also an attempt to make the most of popular support for the war before the economic effects of an embargo began to bite on the merchant community, further destabilising the political situation.

While the basic logistical orders were being sent out, the ministry had to address the emergent diplomatic situation. Walpole had lost the political battle against the war, but his main argument – the impact it would have on the wider diplomatic position – had not been countered or discredited.