Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Pragmatism and post-Nietzschean philosophy
- Part I
- Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as politics
- Heidegger, contingency, and pragmatism
- Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language
- Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens
- Part II
- Part III
- Index of names
Heidegger, contingency, and pragmatism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Pragmatism and post-Nietzschean philosophy
- Part I
- Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as politics
- Heidegger, contingency, and pragmatism
- Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language
- Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens
- Part II
- Part III
- Index of names
Summary
One of the most intriguing features of Heidegger's later thought is his claim that if you begin with Plato's motives and assumptions you will end up with some form of pragmatism. I think that this claim is, when suitably interpreted, right. But, unlike Heidegger, I think pragmatism is a good place to end up. In this paper, I shall try to say how far a pragmatist can play along with Heidegger, and then try to locate the point at which he or she must break off.
A suitable interpretation of Heidegger's claim requires denning Platonism as the claim that the point of inquiry is to get in touch with something like Being, or the Good, or Truth, or Reality – something large and powerful which we have a duty to apprehend correctly. By contrast, pragmatism must be denned as the claim that the function of inquiry is, in Bacon's words, to “relieve and benefit the condition of man” – to make us happier by enabling us to cope more successfully with the physical environment and with each other. Heidegger is arguing that if you start with Plato's account of inquiry you will eventually wind up with Bacon's.
The story Heidegger tells about the transition from the one set of goals to the other is summarized in his “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics” in the second volume of his Nietzsche. Here is one such sketch, entitled “Being” (Das Sein):
Alētheia (apeiron, logos, ben – arche).
Revealing as the order at the start.
Physis, emergence (going back to itself).
Idea, perceivability (agathon), causality.[…]
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- Essays on Heidegger and OthersPhilosophical Papers, pp. 27 - 49Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991
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