Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction: playing with right and wrong
- 2 To prohibit or not to prohibit, that is the question
- 3 Hume's strength of feeling
- 4 Kant's call of duty
- 5 The cost and benefit of virtual violence (and other taboos)
- 6 Are meanings virtually the same?
- 7 There are wrongs and then there are wrongs
- 8 Virtual virtues, virtual vices
- 9 Doing what it takes to win
- 10 Agreeing the rules
- 11 Why would anyone want to do that?
- 12 Coping with virtual taboos
- 13 Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Doing what it takes to win
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction: playing with right and wrong
- 2 To prohibit or not to prohibit, that is the question
- 3 Hume's strength of feeling
- 4 Kant's call of duty
- 5 The cost and benefit of virtual violence (and other taboos)
- 6 Are meanings virtually the same?
- 7 There are wrongs and then there are wrongs
- 8 Virtual virtues, virtual vices
- 9 Doing what it takes to win
- 10 Agreeing the rules
- 11 Why would anyone want to do that?
- 12 Coping with virtual taboos
- 13 Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
For a solitary animal egoism is a virtue that tends to preserve and improve the species: in any kind of community it becomes a destructive vice.
(Schrödinger 1992: 101)In this chapter, I consider the extent to which a strategy available to gamers to facilitate successful gameplay can be said to endorse (even if inadvertently) the fundamental principles of ethical egoism (EE). I then consider whether adopting this strategy, in light of its similarity to EE, is potentially damaging to one's psychological well-being when used in conjunction with STAs and, consequently, whether this potential psychological harm could justify the prohibition of STAs from video games.
In order to explore these issues, I shall: (i) assess whether EE provides an internally consistent structure for prescribing how one ought to behave; (ii) consider the extent to which the aforementioned gaming strategy, while not necessarily construed by the gamer as a moral principle per se, nevertheless matches the fundamental criterion of self-interest characteristic of EE; (iii) present an argument for why EE amounts to a psychologically unhealthy way of behaving; and (iv), given (i–iii), evaluate the extent to which such a strategy, even when adopted against virtual opponents, could prove to be psychologically unhealthy.
One might object to points (i–iii), claiming that they are in many ways redundant, and that point (iv) could be assessed on its own merits in so far as, a posteriori, it could be shown that the gaming strategy is psychologically unhealthy (or not, as the case may be), irrespective of any supposed similarity to EE. If such an assessment is achievable, then it could be done without reference to the alleged perniciousness and detrimental psychological effects of EE.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ethics in the Virtual WorldThe Morality and Psychology of Gaming, pp. 99 - 114Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2013