Introduction and terminology

Chapter 3 suggested that the blame for under-theorisation in empirical research on the HRM–P link lay with scientistic philosophy, the deductive method and the quantitative, statistical and empirical research techniques scientism sponsors. The twin aims of this chapter are to outline what scientism actually involves, before demonstrating its shortcomings. In place of the term ‘philosophy’ which we used throughout the last chapter, we will now use the term ‘meta-theory’ which we will define in a few moments, as part of an opening discussion dealing with some terminology.

Any discussion of philosophy of science requires some familiarity with new, specialist, terminology which is always likely to be a little off-putting at first. That said, the basic terms we introduce below should be within the reach of anyone with a reasonable education, and are certainly no more difficult to understand than many of the technical statistical terms that proliferate in the literature. We will start by introducing and defining some key concepts and then introduce and define others as the chapter unfolds.

Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy more generally concerned with how science (natural and social) is, and perhaps ought to be, conducted. From the early twentieth century it has been concerned primarily with epistemology and methodology, asking questions like: ‘how is knowledge obtained’, ‘how can we test knowledge claims’ and ‘how can we judge between competing theories’?