Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Maps
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 ‘A determined campaign against the terrorist bands’
- 2 ‘Harmonious relations’: soldiers, civilians and committees
- 3 ‘Possibly restrictive to the operations’: marginalising international law in colonial rebellions
- 4 ‘The degree of force necessary’: British traditions in countering colonial rebellions
- 5 ‘Restraint backed by good discipline’
- 6 ‘A dead man cannot talk’: the need for restraint
- 7 ‘A lot of indiscriminate shooting’: military repression before Erskine's arrival
- 8 ‘Severe repressive measures’: the army under Erskine
- 9 ‘An essential part of the campaign’: civil-military alliances
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - ‘A dead man cannot talk’: the need for restraint
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Maps
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 ‘A determined campaign against the terrorist bands’
- 2 ‘Harmonious relations’: soldiers, civilians and committees
- 3 ‘Possibly restrictive to the operations’: marginalising international law in colonial rebellions
- 4 ‘The degree of force necessary’: British traditions in countering colonial rebellions
- 5 ‘Restraint backed by good discipline’
- 6 ‘A dead man cannot talk’: the need for restraint
- 7 ‘A lot of indiscriminate shooting’: military repression before Erskine's arrival
- 8 ‘Severe repressive measures’: the army under Erskine
- 9 ‘An essential part of the campaign’: civil-military alliances
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Having imposed tighter discipline on the army, General Erskine attempted to calibrate the use of force in his strategy to defeat the Mau Mau. Central to his plan was the desire to apply violence directly against the insurgents, yet with sufficient discrimination to spare loyalists. He knew that targeting the entire Kikuyu population, as practised before his arrival, eliminated all incentives for people to support the government. In fact, repression was counterproductive and mobilised the uprising. The military strategy needed to find a number of policies which would not only help discriminate between insurgents and the wider population, but also clearly communicate to the population the government's desire to do so. These policies were seen as militarily effective and help explain, alongside discipline, why the army refrained from a genocidal war.
This chapter analyses four major policy areas where the army aimed at increased restraint concerning the use of force. First, the foundational policy of dividing the colony into legally distinct zones with different rules of engagement is explored. Secondly, throughout the Emergency the authorities aimed to encourage surrenders, on an individual as well as a mass basis. This pursuit is notable bearing in mind that the army was not obliged under international law to take any prisoners at all. The policy proved highly successful and relied in turn upon good discipline. Third, the likelihood of army atrocities against prisoners was minimised because they were quickly handed to the police, thus reducing the chances of any ‘heat of battle’ massacres. None the less, the army issued comprehensive guidelines on dealing with the various categories of prisoner to promote good conduct. Finally, the army engaged in discriminate operations by developing the pseudo-gang and other special forces techniques. In these operations the risks of non-combatants being harmed, central to any definition of restraint, were minimised.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Fighting the Mau MauThe British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency, pp. 128 - 159Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012