Book contents
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- PART I THE UNKNOWABLE
- PART II LAWS OF THE KNOWABLE
- I LAWS IN GENERAL
- II THE LAW OF EVOLUTION
- III THE LAW OF EVOLUTION (CONTINUED)
- IV THE CAUSES OF EVOLUTION
- V SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE
- VI THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF MATTER
- VII THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION
- VIII THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE
- IX THE CORRELATION AND EQUIVALENCE OF FORCES
- X THE DIRECTION OF MOTION
- XI THE RHYTHM OF MOTION
- XII THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EVOLUTION
- XIII THE INSTABILITY OF THE HOMOGENEOUS
- XIV THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS
- XV DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION
- XVI EQUILIBRATION
V - SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- PREFACE
- Contents
- PART I THE UNKNOWABLE
- PART II LAWS OF THE KNOWABLE
- I LAWS IN GENERAL
- II THE LAW OF EVOLUTION
- III THE LAW OF EVOLUTION (CONTINUED)
- IV THE CAUSES OF EVOLUTION
- V SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE
- VI THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF MATTER
- VII THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION
- VIII THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE
- IX THE CORRELATION AND EQUIVALENCE OF FORCES
- X THE DIRECTION OF MOTION
- XI THE RHYTHM OF MOTION
- XII THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO EVOLUTION
- XIII THE INSTABILITY OF THE HOMOGENEOUS
- XIV THE MULTIPLICATION OF EFFECTS
- XV DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION
- XVI EQUILIBRATION
Summary
§ 61. That sceptical state of mind which the criticisms of Philosophy usually produce, is, in great measure, caused by the misinterpretation of words. A sense of universal illusion ordinarily follows the reading of metaphysics; and is strong in proportion as the argument has appeared conclusive. This sense of universal illusion would probably never have arisen, had the terms used been always rightly construed. Unfortunately, these terms have by association acquired meanings that are quite different from those given to them in philosophical discussions; and the ordinary meanings being unavoidably suggested, there results more or less of that dreamlike idealism which is so incongruous with our instinctive convictions. The word phenomenon and its equivalent word appearance, are in great part to blame for this. In ordinary speech, these are uniformly employed in reference to visual perceptions. Habit, almost, if not quite, disables us from thinking of appearance except as something seen; and though phenomenon has a more generalized meaning, yet we cannot rid it of associations with appearance, which is its verbal equivalent. When, therefore, Philosophy proves that our knowledge of the external world can be but phenomenal—when it concludes that the things of which we are conscious are appearances; it inevitably arouses in us the notion of an illusiveness like that to which our visual perceptions are so liable in comparison with our tactual perceptions. Good pictures show us that the aspects of things may be very nearly simulated by colours on canvass.
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- First Principles , pp. 224 - 237Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009First published in: 1862