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Part Three Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2009

Elizabeth Garrett
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Elizabeth A. Graddy
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
Howell E. Jackson
Affiliation:
Harvard Law School, Massachusetts
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Chapter
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Fiscal Challenges
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy
, pp. 322 - 328
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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References

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Burton, A. Abrams and William, R. Dougan, The Effects of Constitutional Restraints on Governmental Spending, 49 pub. choice101 (1986)Google Scholar
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Alberto F. Alesina and Roberto Perotti, Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5556, 1995).
James, E. Alt and Robert, C. Lowry, Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States, 88 am. political sci. rev. 811 (1994)Google Scholar
James, E. Alt and Robert, C. Lowry, A Dynamic Model of State Budget Outcomes Under Divided Partisan Government, 62 j. politics1035 (2000)Google Scholar
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Robert, J. Barro, On the Determination of the Public Debt, 87 j. pol. econ. 940 (1979)Google Scholar
Theodore, C. Bergstrom and Robert, P. Goodman, Private Demands for Public Goods, 63 am. econ. rev. 280 (1973)Google Scholar
Besley, Timothy and Anne, C. Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States, 4 J. Econ. Literature 7 (2003).Google Scholar
Besley, Timothy and Coate, Stephen, Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis, 88 am. econ. rev. 139 (1998)Google Scholar
Henning Bohn and Robert P. Inman, Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W5533, 1996).
Thomas, E. Borchering and Robert, T. Deacon, The Demand for Services of Non-Federal Governments, am. econ. rev. 891 (1972)
Bowen, H. R., The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources, 58 Q.J. Econ. 27 (1943)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowler, Shaun and Donovan, Todd, Measuring the Effect of Direct Democracy on State Policy: Not All Initiatives are Created Equal, 4 st. pol. & pol'y q. 345 (2004)Google Scholar
Geoffrey, F. Brennan and James, M. Buchanan, The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional Constraints on the Power to Tax, 32 nat'l tax j. 11 (1979)Google Scholar
Brennan, Geoffrey and James, M. Buchanan, Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan, 8 j. pub. econ. 255 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, Fred, Election's Winners and Losers, Denver Post, Nov. 6, 2005, at E-06.Google Scholar
Brown, Laurel and Roberts, Blake, Alternative Procedures: Line Item Vetoes and Balanced Budget Amendments 11 (Harvard Law School Federal Budget Policy Seminar Briefing Paper No. 3, 2005), available athttp://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/AlternativeProcedures_3.pdf.Google Scholar
Campbell, Donald and Ross, H. Laurence, The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 3 law & soc'y rev. 33 (1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
James, C. Clingermayer and Wood, B. Dan, Disentangling Patterns of State Debt Financing, 89 am. pol. sci. rev. 108 (1995)Google Scholar
Cox, James and Lowery, David, The Impact of Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps, 3 soc. sci. qu. 492 (1990)Google Scholar
Crain, W. Mark and Tollison, R. D., Time Inconsistency and Fiscal Policy: Empirical Analysis of U.S. States, 1969–89, 51 j. pub. econ. 153 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rui, J. P. de Figueiredo Jr., Endogenous Budget Institutions and Political Insulation: Why States Adopt the Item Veto, 8 j. pub. econ. 2677 (2003)Google Scholar
William R. Dougan, The Effects of Tax and Expenditure Limits on State Governments (George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State Paper No. 54, 1988).
James, W. Douglas and Kim, U. Hoffman, Impoundment at the State Level: Executive Power and Budget Impact, 34 am. rev. pub. admin. 252 (2004)Google Scholar
Epple, Dennis and Romano, Robert, Ends Against the Middle: Determining Public Service Provision When There Are Private Alternatives, 62 j. pub. econ. 297 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
William, A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 43 nat'l tax j. 465 (1989)Google Scholar
Frates, Chris, Fiscal Folly?, 31 st. legislatures 20 (Jan. 2005)Google Scholar
Elisabeth, R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 am. j. pol. sci. 99 (1996)Google Scholar
Elisabeth, R. Gerber and Lupia, Arthur, Campaign Competition and Policy Responsiveness in Direct Legislation Elections, 17 pol. behav. 287 (1995)Google Scholar
Gerber, Elisabeth, Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew, D. McCubbins, When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement, 66 j. pol. 43 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glazer, Amihai, Politics and the Choice of Durability, 79 am. econ. rev. 1207 (1989)Google Scholar
Gene, M. Grossman and Helpman, Elhanan, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63 rev. econ. stud. 265 (1996)Google Scholar
Halper, Evan, Would State Budget Cap Pinch Like Colorado's?, L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 2005.Google Scholar
Douglas, Holtz-Eakin, The Line-Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States, 36 j. pub. econ. 269 (1988)Google Scholar
Howard, Marcia, Tax and Expenditure Limitations: There Is No Story, 9 pub. budgeting & fin. 83 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craig, L. Johnson and Kenneth, A. Kriz, Fiscal Institutions, Credit Ratings, and Borrowing Costs, 25 pub. budgeting & fin. 84 (2005)Google Scholar
Joseph, P. Kalt and Mark, A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 am. econ. rev. 279 (1984)Google Scholar
Paula, S. Kearns, The Determinants of State Budget Periodicity: An Empirical Analysis, 13 pub. budgeting & fin. 40 (1993)Google Scholar
Paula, S. Kearns, State Budget Periodicity: An Analysis of the Determinants and the Effect on State Spending, 13 j. pol'y analysis & mgmt. 331 (1994)Google Scholar
Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Szakaly, Kristin, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. & econ. 62 (1996)Google Scholar
Tyson, King-Meadows and Lowery, David, The Impact of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps: A Research Update, 16 pub. budgeting & fin. 102 (1996)Google Scholar
Brian, G. Knight, Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, 76 j. pub. econ. 41 (2000)Google Scholar
Knight, Brian and Levinson, Arik, Rainy Day Funds and State Government Savings, 52 nat'l tax j. 459 (1999)Google Scholar
Thad Kousser and Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives and Policy Making by Direct Democracy, 78 s. cal l. rev. 949 (2005).
Thad Kousser and Justin Phillips, Who Sets the Size of State Government? Comparing Models of Interbranch Conflict (prepared for presentation at the 2005 Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 2005).
Finn, E. Kydland and Edward, C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 j. pol. econ. 473 (1977)Google Scholar
Thomas, P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in Government Budgeting, 16 pub. budgeting & fin. 97 (1996)Google Scholar
Lucas, Robert and Stokey, Edith, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital, 12 j. monetary econ. 55 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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