One of the long-standing arguments during the Vietnam war concerned the prospects for economic development while the war was in progress. In essence, the pessimists thought that the combined military-political problem had to be resolved in advance of economic development, because the latter depended on a stable military-political environment. Optimists thought that substantial development could occur while the war was being fought. On this view, foreign aid could stabilize the economy and promote development simultaneously. To the optimists, the relevant question pertained to the amount of aid required to put Vietnam on the path of self-sustaining growth, and studies were commissioned to determine the amount of aid needed.

We have argued that not much economic development occurred during the war. If this is correct, should one then conclude that the pessimists were right? We do not think so. A demonstration that significant development did not occur during the war is no proof that it could not have occurred.

This chapter deals with a wider question than the one that concerned Vietnam optimists and pessimists. Here we face the general question whether or not it is reasonable to expect significant economic development to take place over a relatively short period of time, say two decades, in an environment of high military threat if other conditions are favorable.