Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Preface
- Governing the Firm
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Normative Perspectives
- 3 Workers' Control in Action (I)
- 4 Workers' Control in Action (II)
- 5 Conceptual Foundations
- 6 Explanatory Strategies
- 7 A Question of Objectives
- 8 Views from Economic Theory (I)
- 9 Views from Economic Theory (II)
- 10 Transitions and Clusters
- 11 Toward a Synthesis
- 12 Getting There from Here
- References
- Index
3 - Workers' Control in Action (I)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figures
- Preface
- Governing the Firm
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Normative Perspectives
- 3 Workers' Control in Action (I)
- 4 Workers' Control in Action (II)
- 5 Conceptual Foundations
- 6 Explanatory Strategies
- 7 A Question of Objectives
- 8 Views from Economic Theory (I)
- 9 Views from Economic Theory (II)
- 10 Transitions and Clusters
- 11 Toward a Synthesis
- 12 Getting There from Here
- References
- Index
Summary
Surveying the Terrain
Before assessing candidate explanations for the rarity of workers' control, one must become acquainted with some of the rich descriptive material on the topic. This literature is overwhelming in both scale and scope, making a complete survey impossible. But it is vital to investigate a few cases of workers' control in order to anchor later theoretical analysis in factual bedrock. I have chosen some examples for which there is good information on the historical origins and organizational structures of the firms involved. Priority has also been given to examples that have inspired ongoing research by economists and others.
By these criteria, it is essential to pause for photo opportunities at the U.S. plywood cooperatives, the Mondragon system in Spain, and the Lega federation in Italy. All three cases are clearly success stories in the annals of workers' control, and have been studied extensively. While not representative in any statistical sense, these cases raise intriguing questions. How did such firms thrive in competition with capitalist rivals? Why has their success not been replicated elsewhere? Why plywood? Why the Basques? Why northern Italy?
I also inspect two less exotic species: employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the United States and legislated codetermination in Germany. The firms in these categories tend to occupy an intermediate position between the abstract extremes of management by capital suppliers or by labor suppliers.
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- Information
- Governing the FirmWorkers' Control in Theory and Practice, pp. 45 - 66Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003