It was Hegel, more than any other thinker, who first expressly integrated the domain of historical experience and the continuing effects of the past into the substance of philosophical reflection. But his own comprehensive and differentiated interest in such objects of reflection has not so much prevented as even encouraged an unparalleled critical discussion of the appropriate relationship between thought and actuality, specifically in relation to his own philosophy. For what are the rights and obligations of philosophy, as a social and political “institution,” with respect to making its presence felt within the realm of actuality? And how are we to adjudicate the potential conflicts that may arise between the practice of philosophy and that of other institutions? To ask this question is not a matter of simply addressing the problem of practical and philosophical consciousness in the abstract. On the contrary, it draws philosophy explicitly into the sphere of what Hegel describes as the “ethical world.” How does philosophy appear within the totality of this world? And what can properly be expected of philosophy in this context? What is the role of philosophy in shaping our attitudes and intentions in relation to competing judgments and authorities, and what role does philosophy expressly ascribe to itself in this connection? Can the traditional self-sufficiency of speculative cognition, oriented as it is solely toward the truth, survive the exceedingly mistrustful demand that philosophy demonstrate its practical usefulness? Can philosophy preserve the inner character of its orientation to truth and prevent this orientation, in the admittedly questionable and external conditions of social life, from becoming a breeding ground for dangerous illusions or a bastion of universal dogmas, and thus in both cases hinder any genuine advance toward pragmatic insight and knowledge? And even then, can philosophy assume for itself the right to criticize the external relations of the social domain? Can philosophy enter into a certain opposition to the ruling power of government without either making itself ridiculous or arrogating power to itself in the process? It is with these questions that the following discussion is principally concerned.