Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Publication Citation Style
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Naturalism, Plato, Kant, and Hegel on Reason, Freedom, Responsibility, Ethics, and God
- 3 Reality, Freedom, and God (Science of Logic I)
- 4 Identity, Contradiction, Actuality, and Freedom (Science of Logic II)
- 5 Freedom, God, and the Refutation of Rational Egoism (Science of Logic III)
- 6 Nature, Freedom, Ethics, and God (The Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit)
- 7 Conclusion
- Index
6 - Nature, Freedom, Ethics, and God (The Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Publication Citation Style
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Naturalism, Plato, Kant, and Hegel on Reason, Freedom, Responsibility, Ethics, and God
- 3 Reality, Freedom, and God (Science of Logic I)
- 4 Identity, Contradiction, Actuality, and Freedom (Science of Logic II)
- 5 Freedom, God, and the Refutation of Rational Egoism (Science of Logic III)
- 6 Nature, Freedom, Ethics, and God (The Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit)
- 7 Conclusion
- Index
Summary
From Logic to Nature to Spirit
The Logic, as such, concludes with the Idea's comprehending its own self-comprehension, and thus ceasing to be a mere “content and object,” for itself, and becoming instead “science,” which knows itself (WL 6:572/GW 12:253,13/843). As such, however, it is still “enclosed within [eingeschlossen in] pure thought” or “subjectivity” (WL 6:572/ GW 12:253,15–19/843). But
when the Idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure Concept and its reality, and thus contracts itself into the immediacy of Being, it is totality in this form: Nature.
(WL 6:573/GW 12:253,24–27/843)This positing or contraction, Hegel explains, is not a process of “becoming” or “transition,” like the one that produced “Objectivity” (which anticipated many features of what we might think of as “nature,” such as mechanism, “chemism,” and so forth). The pure Idea is already “absolute liberation,” so that it contains “no immediate determination that isn't already posited and Concept”; consequently, no “transition” can occur in it (WL 6:573/GW 12:253,27–32/843). So the right way to describe what goes on here, Hegel says, is to say that “the Idea freely releases itself, in absolute self-assurance and resting in itself” (WL 6:573/GW 12:253,38–39/843). In order to be equally free, the form of the result is the “absolute externality of space and time, existing for itself without subjectivity” (WL 6:573/GW 12:253,2–4/843).
What kind of “freedom” is this, we might ask, by which something that is absolutely “external” and lacks all subjectivity comes into being?
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- Information
- Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God , pp. 268 - 318Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005