Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Glossaries
- Chronology
- Preface to the second edition: Towards 2020
- Introduction
- 1 Zionism and security
- 2 The Hebrew Republic
- 3 New immigrants and first elections
- 4 The politics of piety
- 5 Retaliation or self-restraint
- 6 The Rise of The Right
- 7 The Road to Beirut
- 8 Dissent at Home and Abroad
- 9 An insurrection before a handshake
- 10 The end of ideology?
- 11 The Killing of a Prime Minister
- 12 The Magician and the Bulldozer
- 13 ‘He does not stop at the red light’
- 14 An unlikely grandfather
- 15 A Brotherly Conflict
- 16 Bialik's bequest?
- 17 Stagnation and Isolationism
- 18 An Arab Spring and an Israeli winter?
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
12 - The Magician and the Bulldozer
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Maps
- Acknowledgements
- Glossaries
- Chronology
- Preface to the second edition: Towards 2020
- Introduction
- 1 Zionism and security
- 2 The Hebrew Republic
- 3 New immigrants and first elections
- 4 The politics of piety
- 5 Retaliation or self-restraint
- 6 The Rise of The Right
- 7 The Road to Beirut
- 8 Dissent at Home and Abroad
- 9 An insurrection before a handshake
- 10 The end of ideology?
- 11 The Killing of a Prime Minister
- 12 The Magician and the Bulldozer
- 13 ‘He does not stop at the red light’
- 14 An unlikely grandfather
- 15 A Brotherly Conflict
- 16 Bialik's bequest?
- 17 Stagnation and Isolationism
- 18 An Arab Spring and an Israeli winter?
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
The Virtual and the Real Likud
The narrow election victory of Bibi Netanyahu in 1996 was unexpected and dismayed a wide coalition stretching from the refugee camps of Gaza to the White House. Despite Peres's unconvincing attempt to act as if he was Rabin's natural successor, a series of suicide bombings convinced the Israeli public that the Oslo process had brought neither peace nor security. The peace process, it was reasoned, needed to be slowed down, but not extinguished.
Netanyahu's victory by default did little to earn him the public's trust. He was instead dubbed ‘the magician’ because of the unexpected result. Israeli journalists showed little love for Netanyahu. In one sense, they projected the election as almost a referendum on the Rabin assassination in the expectation that Peres's victory would have been ‘a minimal moral compensation’ for the killing of the Prime Minister.
There was also a deep resentment within the Likud within weeks of winning power. Netanyahu initially attempted tomarginalize his colleagues in the Likud by not consulting them either during coalition negotiations or in appointing government ministers.
Moreover, Netanyahu desperately wished to keep Sharon at arm’s length and to keep him out of the inner cabinet. Indeed, he was unable to present his government because of the dispute over a portfolio for Sharon. On a personal level, there was no love lost between the two. In the past, Sharon had ridiculed Netanyahu, referring to his public explanation of extra-marital affairs, when he commented that ‘there are leaders who solve problems and others who get caught with their pants down’. Netanyahu, in frustration, spoke of Sharon’s incessant and tireless subversion. When the pressure from the Right proved too great, he simply expanded the cabinet and created the Ministry of National Infrastructure for Sharon.
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- Information
- A History of Modern Israel , pp. 267 - 288Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013