Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART I
- PART II
- 5 The French War in Algeria
- 6 French Instrumental Dependence and its Consequences
- 7 The Development of a Normative Difference in France, and Its Consequences
- 8 The French Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative Gap and the Rise of the “Democratic Agenda”
- 9 Political Relevance and its Consequences in France
- PART III
- PART IV
- Postscript
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - French Instrumental Dependence and its Consequences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART I
- PART II
- 5 The French War in Algeria
- 6 French Instrumental Dependence and its Consequences
- 7 The Development of a Normative Difference in France, and Its Consequences
- 8 The French Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative Gap and the Rise of the “Democratic Agenda”
- 9 Political Relevance and its Consequences in France
- PART III
- PART IV
- Postscript
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The major dilemma French governments faced when they were presented with the Algerian upheaval was not whether to fight, but rather how to fight – whether to take the political risk of involving French society at large in the war or remain cautious and insulate society as much as possible from the war. Certain attributes of Algeria made this dilemma more wrenching. Most notably, some of the reasons that pushed French governments toward the resolution of the conflict by force – a long mutual history with Algeria, memories of its significance for Free France, its proximity, and the magnitude and power of the vociferous Algerian lobby – also made harder the isolation of the events in Algeria from the French collective consciousness. The massive presence of Algerian labor in France also promised that the Algerian problem would create echoes at home.
Thus, French politicians maintained a duality in their statements, and a gap between the latter and their actions, in order to accommodate the inherent saliency of Algeria with the desire to avoid the political uncertainty involved in the nationalization of the war. Indeed, French leaders initially boasted with high rhetoric, but avoided backing their words with a real commitment of society to the war. Politicians vowed to preserve French Algeria, but the events in Algeria were depicted to the public as comprising a set of police operations against bands of outlaws.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- How Democracies Lose Small WarsState, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam, pp. 99 - 107Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003