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two - Rationality, sociability and human dignity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2022

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Summary

As illustrated in Chapter One, since the concept of human dignity is vague it is hard to judge whether some welfare practices enhance or suppress the dignity of welfare recipients. Yet some governments cite dignity as a moral justification for regulating the behaviour of unemployed persons. Thus it is essential to explore the concept of dignity in order to assess the impact of current welfare measures on recipients. The exploration of human dignity should start from human nature. As Muzaffar asks, ‘How can one talk of the rights of the human being without a more profound understanding of the human being him [her] self?’ (quoted in Goolam, 2001). After an examination of the interaction between cognitive capacities and the social world, it is suggested that our worth as human beings resides in our possession of rational and social capacities striving for autonomy and mutuality. In meeting the needs of citizens, a society has to provide them with the necessary conditions for facilitating their autonomy and for developing their social relationships.

Human rationality and sociability

Dignity reflects the worth of human beings (Margalit, 1996). It is from this that we derive our capacity for autonomy and mutuality. Belief in human worth is shared by both western and eastern systems of thought. In Judaeo-Christian thought, the value of humans is derived from their being uniquely created in the divine image. Liberty is intrinsic to human dignity (Novak, 1998). A person has ‘a capacity for insight and choice and an independent existence as a locus of responsibility’ (1998). Moreover, Thomas Aquinas claimed that human beings have a capacity for and an orientation to a metaphysical knowledge of reality (Farrelly, 2003). In China, Confucius saw ‘human nature as tending toward goodness’ (Fu, 1991). ‘Jen’, the highest moral standard of humans, is a ‘man's inner tendency and that is within man's ability to practice “jen”’ (Fu, 1991). Mencius, an influential follower of Confucianism, further argued that human nature (hsing) comes from ‘birth’ or ‘to be born with’ (sheing). ‘Hsing’ consists of four innate and proper human aspirations: inter-human affection, righteousness, propriety and discernment of right and wrong (Hang, 1994). Thus, the Confucian school sees people as possessing inner capacities that allow them to make judgements and to pursue a moral life.

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Publisher: Bristol University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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