Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Table of Cases
- Part I Fundamental concepts and sources
- 1 The various aspects of human dignity
- 2 The intellectual history of the social value of human dignity
- 3 Human dignity as a value and as a right in international documents
- 4 Human dignity as a value and as a right in constitutions
- Part II Human dignity as a constitutional value
- Part III Human dignity as a constitutional right
- Part IV Human dignity in comparative law
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
2 - The intellectual history of the social value of human dignity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Table of Cases
- Part I Fundamental concepts and sources
- 1 The various aspects of human dignity
- 2 The intellectual history of the social value of human dignity
- 3 Human dignity as a value and as a right in international documents
- 4 Human dignity as a value and as a right in constitutions
- Part II Human dignity as a constitutional value
- Part III Human dignity as a constitutional right
- Part IV Human dignity in comparative law
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
History of ideas
Understanding the concept of human dignity requires an understanding of its long history. Knowledge of this concept’s origins can assist us in understanding where it is leading us. Pieroth and Schlink correctly noted that the concept of human dignity is loaded with 2,500 years of history. I would like to follow the development of this concept. I would also like to understand it in places where human dignity was referred to not by that express term, but by ideas that express our understanding of it today. The historical examination of human dignity, however, should be approached very cautiously. This is due not only to my lack of expertise on the history of ideas, but also to the objective difficulty in knowing, with the proper level of caution, if this same idea is being developed consecutively throughout the history. Tracking the term “human dignity” (Menschenwürde) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for examining this history. It is also difficult to determine the historical point of departure, which at times is arbitrary. Furthermore, we naturally proceed from the modern concept of human dignity backward, to those conceptions that might help us to understand the modern concept. We thus skip over those historical aspects that have no modern expression, but might be expressed in the future. Our examination is, therefore, to a great extent arbitrary.
Ultimately, as jurists interpreting a constitutional text, we are interested in the meaning of the constitutional value or the constitutional right in our modern constitutions. That is not what the theologians and the philosophers who dealt with human dignity were dealing with. While acknowledging the importance of their examination, its bearing on understanding the modern constitutional meaning is not decisive. Ultimately, as interpreters of a constitutional text, we are interested in knowing the content of the modern constitutional value or the constitutional right. The importance of the information regarding the intellectual history of human dignity is limited.
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- Human DignityThe Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right, pp. 15 - 33Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015