In the last decade of the twentieth century the United Nations created two international criminal courts, the first in almost fifty years. Moreover a Diplomatic Conference approved a statute for a permanent international criminal court, to be loosely associated with the UN. In the abstract it is hard to disagree with the proposition that those who commit gross violations of internationally recognized human rights such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity should face international criminal justice. If we had a standing international criminal court, or even a system of reliable ad hoc international criminal tribunals, we could punish individual criminals with more certainty, bring some catharsis to victims and/or their relatives, try to break the vicious circle of group violence, and hope to deter similar future acts.

In international relations as it continues to exist on the eve of the twenty-first century, however, while there may be an embryonic trend toward more use of adjudication, many policy makers are obviously reluctant to pursue criminal justice through international tribunals. Sometimes this hesitancy is the product of callous and uncritical realist attitudes. But sometimes these policies of hesitation are characterized by careful reasoning and serious moral argument.

Hesitancy about international criminal justice is thus not always a reflex reaction by the Saddam Husseins of the world who wish to elevate repressive privilege over protection of international human rights. Caution is also sometimes evidenced by persons of relatively liberal persuasion who by definition are motivated by considerable concern for human dignity.