Hume’s signature contribution to the theory of justice has long been taken to consist in the Treatise’s argument for justice as an artificial virtue. Yet Hume’s re-presentation of his theory of justice in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals makes no reference whatsoever to justice as an artificial virtue. Given this fundamental difference, interpreters are compelled to explain what exactly changed in Hume’s shift from one sort of account to another, as well as what, if anything, is significant in Hume’s mature theory of justice once the idea of justice’s artificiality has been taken off the table.  The present essay focuses on two key sections of the second Enquiry – “Of Justice” and “Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice” – to argue for two claims. First, in shifting away from the debate over whether justice is natural or artificial, the second Enquiry focuses instead on how political actors and political orders enable natural justice to be operationalized in practical life. Second, Hume’s account of justice in the second Enquiry reveals a crucial albeit underemphasized aspect of his moral epistemology, namely the crucial role played by reason in moral motivation and evaluation.