Introduction

Throughout the early 1990s, US policy towards the conflict in Bosnia varied significantly despite relative stability in material and coalitional alignments. In Part II, I trace the variations in America's policy towards ethnic cleansing in Bosnia across the presidencies of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Specifically, I ask: why did both administrations seek to avoid military engagement in Bosnia, only for Clinton to have a change of heart in 1995? This is a significant case in US foreign policy decision-making regarding decisions to use military force abroad for the purpose of preventing mass atrocities. It spans two presidential administrations and given that national security arguments against the use of force remained fundamentally unchanged, it represents a ‘least likely’ case.

In this chapter, I examine the Bush and Clinton administrations’ early management of the crisis in Bosnia. I highlight the way in which cognitive repression saw more cognitive interpretations of US interests regarding the balance of power advanced as US interests were intellectually refined to avoid affective influences. In this way – even as the Vietnam-era hangover eased following early successes in the Persian Gulf war – the Powell Doctrine would become entrenched in the Bush administration's foreign policy.

In the second section, I show that even as Clinton appealed for greater US involvement in Bosnia, citing the need to exercise American leadership and a responsibility to our fellow human beings, the risks presented by taking action soon became overwhelming. When Clinton came to office, he would conform to a policy similar to that of the Bush administration. In doing so, he ‘repressed’ principled efforts by members of the administration – including Vice President Al Gore, and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright – and his initial impulses to implement a ‘lift and strike’ policy. Instead, Clinton found himself siding with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell's more cognitive efforts to avoid a quagmire, just as his predecessor had done.

Cognitive repression in Bosnia: ‘We do deserts, not mountains or jungles’

Even as success in the Persian Gulf saw the Bush administration begin to move beyond post-Vietnam-era restraint, the administration remained cautious when it came to the use of military force in foreign interventions. Military force was not to be used unless there was a clear and present danger to the vital national security interests of the US.