Part 2 explained how laws can be used to effectuate a policy of existential segregation against the members of disfavored classes of human beings. Chapter 8 offered antimiscegenation laws as a historical example of existential segregation, and explained how anticloning laws seek to effectuate a policy of existential segregation today. Chapter 9 outlined the harm that anticloning laws can inflict on parents and children and argued that anticloning laws should not be proposed, applied, or enacted.

Part 3 turns now to a different question: If anticloning laws are on the books, how can human clones and their families invalidate the laws?

One answer that readily comes to mind is that the parents of human clones could challenge the laws as a violation of their own fundamental constitutional rights. This is the strategy that has been used to combat existential segregation successfully in the recent past. As we have seen, antimiscegenation laws were intended, in part, to prevent the birth of mixed-race children. However, when the Supreme Court struck down those laws, it focused on the rights of the parents of such children, ruling that the laws infringed on their fundamental right to marry.

In the context of anticloning laws, which seek to outlaw asexual reproduction, the fundamental right to privacy seems more relevant. As noted in Chapter 9, a growing number of lawyers and scholars have argued that the right to privacy includes a right to employ human reproductive cloning – at least for individuals who lack viable gametes and cannot reproduce in the usual sexual manner.