The NWC Historical Archives also show that, in 1911, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote to R. P. Rodgers, president, U.S. Naval War College, to explain that if Japan occupied and fortified a large number of Pacific islands, then it would be “tied to supporting them” and “It might even be urged as a sound policy on the part of Blue [U.S.], to induce Orange [Japan] to such distant effort, which would place it in the same position the Blue finds so difficult in trans-Pacific operations.” Mahan's idea had much in common with the Asian game of “Wei-ch’i” in China, or “Go” in Japan, which unlike Western games like Chess sought to take strategic territory so as to surround the enemy's bases, not to destroy them directly by a frontal assault but to render them ineffective. Coincidentally, during World War II many Japanese bases on various Pacific Islands were not attacked, but were hopped over, surrounded and over time “withered on the vine.”

Mahan also proposed the concept of “island hopping.” On 4 March 1911, Mahan told Rodgers: “In short, I believe Blue can recover a base, and gradually recover all captured positions [from Orange] in such order as may seem expedient. Some [Japanese island bases] may be even neglected, as immaterial, in favor of offensive action against the enemy's positions” (see Picture 1).

In a 22 February 1911 letter, Mahan made this strategy of skipping over certain Japanese bases even more clear when he discussed holding a certain island base as “a stepping stone to a base in or near the Orange territory, from which the superior Blue fleet can operate offensively as may be judged most expedient.” Mahan's top choice for this Blue base was the island of Okinawa: “An anchorage in the LuChus [Okinawa] is the most effective position for the Blue Fleet.” Further, if Guam was skipped on the way to Okinawa, this would not matter much, since by taking Okinawa all communications to the south would be crippled and so this “would probably cause the recall of [ Japanese] cruisers based on Guam […].”