With the defusing of the Rhineland crisis on April 22 and the collapse of Abyssinian resistance in the week following, the foundations of British policy had been destroyed. Collective Security had failed, and it was necessary to find something to replace it. From mid-April onwards a major element in Eden's policy was the search for an alternative.

So far as the League was concerned, he was clear that it could not be restored to its pre-Abyssinia position. However unwilling to abandon it and however insistent on the need to revitalise it, he saw that it would be a long time before it was revived. Germany was not a member. Since German and Italian intentions were the problem, it could only be restored if Hitler turned out to be a reliable European. He had left no reason for supposing that he would be.

Towards Italy Eden had been consistent and unequivocal. It had been essential, in the first place, that Mussolini should be beaten. When he won, it had been essential to do nothing to condone his victory. In both cases Eden had refused to buy co-operation against Germany, since an Italian success, following Hitler's success in the Rhineland, would so much discredit the League that there would be Rhinelands elsewhere.