Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Sources
- 1 Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility
- 2 Freedom of the will and the concept of a person
- 3 Coercion and moral responsibility
- 4 Three concepts of free action
- 5 Identification and externality
- 6 The problem of action
- 7 The importance of what we care about
- 8 What we are morally responsible for
- 9 Necessity and desire
- 10 On bullshit
- 11 Equality as a moral ideal
- 12 Identification and wholeheartedness
- 13 Rationality and the unthinkable
13 - Rationality and the unthinkable
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Sources
- 1 Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility
- 2 Freedom of the will and the concept of a person
- 3 Coercion and moral responsibility
- 4 Three concepts of free action
- 5 Identification and externality
- 6 The problem of action
- 7 The importance of what we care about
- 8 What we are morally responsible for
- 9 Necessity and desire
- 10 On bullshit
- 11 Equality as a moral ideal
- 12 Identification and wholeheartedness
- 13 Rationality and the unthinkable
Summary
With respect to actions of whatever sort, circumstances are conceivable in which an action of just that sort would have greater utility than any available alternative. This means that if utilitarianism is correct, anything might at some point be morally imperative. There are people who make a similar point about atheism. If God does not exist, they say, anything goes. A person may do or be whatever he likes.
These observations concerning atheism and utilitarianism are not the same, but they are closely related. Each suggests that the doctrine to which it pertains makes it impossible to believe that there are absolute moral limits. Atheism is supposed to have the consequence that nothing is forbidden: If there is no God, everything is permitted. Utilitarianism is supposed to imply, correspondingly, that anything may be required. On the assumption that these characterizations of the two doctrines are correct, adherents of neither doctrine acknowledge any unconditional moral constraints. Utilitarians and atheists agree, in other words, that nothing can be ruled out in advance.
We are accustomed to taking it for granted that enlargements of our freedom enrich us. They do so, however, only up to a point. If the restrictions upon the choices that a person can make are loosened too far, he may become disoriented and uncertain about what and how to choose. Extensive proliferation of his options may weaken his grasp of his own identity.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Importance of What We Care AboutPhilosophical Essays, pp. 177 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1988
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