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10 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2011

David M. Leibowitz
Affiliation:
Kenyon College, Ohio
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Summary

Socrates' Human Wisdom and Knowledge of Virtue

We learn from the Apology that Socrates does not know what virtue is. But he seems confident that he knows very well what we expect or hope for from virtue; he seems confident that he knows the power we expect it to have. He conveys this understanding, in part, by making a number of extreme statements about virtue. These statements appear to run contrary to ordinary good sense and experience, but I think they merely make explicit the extraordinary hopes that are implied in our ordinary beliefs about virtue. (A few words on the existence of these ordinary beliefs. Don't all of us suppose that we know, if only imperfectly, the difference between a virtuous or good man and a wicked or bad one? Don't we all respect ourselves on some occasions for living up to what virtue demands of us and reproach ourselves on others for falling short? Haven't all of us been moved by concern for our dignity to open a book and study when laziness or frivolous distraction seemed about to get the better of us? Studying or philosophizing, too, can appear as a duty, or demand of virtue.)

To return to the subject of his extreme statements, Socrates says that he exhorted the Athenians to virtue with these words: “Not from money comes virtue, but from virtue comes money and all of the other good things for human beings both privately and publicly” (30b2–4).

Type
Chapter
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The Ironic Defense of Socrates
Plato's Apology
, pp. 175 - 184
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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  • Conclusion
  • David M. Leibowitz, Kenyon College, Ohio
  • Book: The Ironic Defense of Socrates
  • Online publication: 05 August 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761829.011
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  • Conclusion
  • David M. Leibowitz, Kenyon College, Ohio
  • Book: The Ironic Defense of Socrates
  • Online publication: 05 August 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761829.011
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • David M. Leibowitz, Kenyon College, Ohio
  • Book: The Ironic Defense of Socrates
  • Online publication: 05 August 2011
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511761829.011
Available formats
×