The model of uptake described in Chapter 1 requires that legislators recognize and act on their challengers' campaign issues. I proposed that engaging in this behavior is a strategic choice, undertaken by legislators who believe that it will promote their reelection goals. Presumably, all other things being equal, legislators would not choose to act on their challengers' themes, as paying attention to these issues diverts attention from other issues that may be of more intrinsic interest to them. However, to the extent that doing so helps them to accomplish their electoral goals, they have a clear incentive to look to their previous campaign experiences when formulating their agendas. Of course, reelection is not legislators' only goal; they may also want, as Fenno (1973) noted, to make good public policy or to achieve influence in Congress. They may also wish to be good representatives, faithfully reflecting their constituency's interests, apart from any tangible benefit they may receive. Nonetheless, rational legislators should recognize that they cannot achieve these other goals unless they are able to remain in office, and so reelection is, for the majority, the most proximate goal.

This idea of the electoral connection, that, while in office, “congressmen must constantly engage in activities related to reelection” (Mayhew 1974, 49), has become central to the study of legislative behavior. The possible mechanisms for this connection are numerous and are discussed in more detail later.