This book has proposed three principal hypotheses. One is that the American centers were not comparable to any kind of 1940s or historic concentration camp. Still, most who employ the term concentration camp will not stop using it. So we should at least remind readers that, in short, the inhabitants of American centers enjoyed privileges and opportunities that an inmate of a concentration camp could not even have dreamed of. A second thesis is that the Roosevelt Administration bungled its handling of the Nikkei and largely stumbled into the relocation centers solution. It had a plan for dealing with the dangerous Nikkei minority, but not for dealing with the vast majority of non-dangerous ones. It had not foreseen how its diplomatic measures might affect the American overseas Japanese, much less how its unsettling of public opinion might impact the Nikkei economy. Only bungling on this scale could have made the relocation centers seem a logical and even humane solution to the war caused dilemmas of the Nikkei. In fairness to FDR, he was heavily involved in myriad, terrible military problems, but this one was not well done. A third thesis is that the issue of racism has been greatly exaggerated by historians and that anti-Japanese feeling was a much more complex and nuanced matter than has usually been assumed.