If literatures on legitimacy in law and courts are correct, then it is likely that transparency reinforces beliefs in judicial legitimacy. The received wisdom in that literature is that legitimacy ultimately derives from perceptions of procedural fairness (e.g., Tyler 1990; 2009), and that these perceptions are likely to emerge with repeated exposure to the technical nature of judging. Essentially, the information people receive about judging (e.g., technical language and formal procedure) is biased toward creating positive affect, such that increasing exposure to courts increases support for courts on average (Caldeira 1986, 1222; Gibson and Caldeira 2009).

The positivity bias hypothesis has received considerable empirical support, especially in studies conducted in the United States (Caldeira 1986; Casey 1974; Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968). In a number of contexts, using a variety of measures, scholars have found that greater awareness with the U.S. Supreme Court is associated with higher levels of diffuse public support (i.e., legitimacy). Comparative research has produced similar findings. Table 5.1 reviews key results from Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird's (1998, 353, hereafter GCB) study of high court diffuse support in the United States and seventeen European countries, the only systematic comparative analysis of the relationship between awareness and high court legitimacy. GCB provide two empirical tests of the argument at the individual level. For each country, they regress individual beliefs in the legitimacy of high courts on the self-reported level of familiarity with those courts.