In 2009–2010, both the European Union and the Council of Europe adopted new procedures that required judicial candidates to the Luxembourg or Strasbourg courts to be vetted by newly created blue ribbon panels of experts. Why would the governments of the European member states have passed such reforms, which encroach upon their almost unfettered freedom to name judges of their own choosing? True, these reforms helped the established European member states to manage the uncertainty generated by the large-scale European accession of former Eastern Bloc countries in the post-1989 period. But the reforms must also be understood in neo-institutionalist terms. A broad range of domestic and supranational actors have used these reforms as a means to leverage the professional, institutional, and conceptual opportunities afforded by European institutional structures. Working to promote the legitimacy and authority of the European courts and of their respective institutions, these actors have put forward reforms that are significantly more bold and creative than the ponderous judicial independence and judicial quality measures they claim to be. Taken at their word as measures designed to increase the public legitimacy and authority of the European courts, however, they are likely to prove ineffectual.