Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Muddling along
- 3 The ‘curse’ of formalism
- 4 Legal fundamentalism
- 5 The idolatry of certainty
- 6 The piety of precedent
- 7 The foibles of precedent – a case study
- 8 There is no impersonal law
- 9 So, what is the law?
- 10 The constraints on the judiciary
- 11 Towards a new judicial methodology
- 12 Of realism and pragmatism
- 13 Of … practical reasoning and principles
- 14 Taking law seriously
- 15 A theory of ameliorative justice
- Subject index
- Authors index
9 - So, what is the law?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Muddling along
- 3 The ‘curse’ of formalism
- 4 Legal fundamentalism
- 5 The idolatry of certainty
- 6 The piety of precedent
- 7 The foibles of precedent – a case study
- 8 There is no impersonal law
- 9 So, what is the law?
- 10 The constraints on the judiciary
- 11 Towards a new judicial methodology
- 12 Of realism and pragmatism
- 13 Of … practical reasoning and principles
- 14 Taking law seriously
- 15 A theory of ameliorative justice
- Subject index
- Authors index
Summary
‘The law’ is essentially a process
The fact that there is no impersonal law does not denude the phrase, ‘the law’, of all meaning. Usage alone requires that it be given a meaning. But this is not to say that the question; ‘What is the law?’ is anything other than congenitally ambiguous. What lawyers will mean by the word ‘law’ in the concept, the ‘rule of law’ will be one thing, what they mean by the word ‘law’ in the judicial oath requiring the judge to do right ‘according to law’ will be another. Laypersons will use the words ‘the law’ to signify those statutes and rules that must be obeyed or that will attract a penalty if not complied with. The fact the meaning of some statutes and rules may be a trifle vague so that it is not known exactly what it is to be obeyed or complied with does not detract from this meaning. Legal theorists may need to adopt different meanings depending on what particular theory they are seeking to propound. As William Twining has pointed out, a common error in contemporary jurisprudence arises from the tendency to treat all ‘legal theories’ as if they were attempts to answer the same question or set of questions. Jurisprudence is not a single-question subject. A meaning can be taken down from the jurisprudential shelf and dusted off for any particular theory.
Depending on the purpose and topic, a great number of things may be included in ‘the law’.
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- Information
- The Judicial ProcessRealism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles, pp. 217 - 240Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005