What is the relationship between the justice motive, so brilliantly described by Lerner, and moral motivation? Does one subsume the other? Dominant views within moral psychology (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969, 1976) and moral philosophy (Rawls, 1971) might lead one to think that the concept of justice has replaced the concept of morality – or should. I wish to argue that the concepts of justice and morality should be kept distinct and that, specifically, justice motivation and moral motivation should be kept distinct. I think that doing so is necessary lest the theoretical and practical importance of these two forms of motivation be compromised. The first step in my argument is a brief review of the insights into the justice motive provided by Lerner.

The Justice Motive

As presented by Lerner (1970, 1980, 1981, 1982; Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976), the core of the justice motive is the need to believe in a just world, a world in which people get what they deserve and deserve what they get – or at least a world in which terrible things do not happen to good people (Lerner & Goldberg, 1999). Early classic experiments by Lerner and Simmons (1966), among others, demonstrated that this motive could be aroused by witnessing innocent suffering, which threatens the belief in a just world.