Introduction

The aim of this book has been to interrogate the relationship between technology and security as it has been discursively configured and understood within a given context – that of ballistic missile defence advocacy in the United States. A primary move made was to eschew the common tendency to treat technology as a discrete object of analysis in the study (and practice) of security, one that is either determinate of or determined by security relations. Instead, the analysis given here invited us to consider the question of how such ways of understanding and representing technology contribute to the manner in which security, specifically nuclear security, is pursued.

Nowhere is this question more pertinent and appropriate than in the case of American ballistic missile defence. US missile defence, historically, is a perfect instance of investment in technology in pursuit of security. In concrete terms this boils down to issues such as whether we can or should expect defensive technologies to progress to a capacity to intercept ICBMs and what the questionable testing record of missile defence implies for its future prospects and funding. Logically, therefore, the way technology is understood and articulated in the promotion of missile defence is of critical importance. Building on the theoretical outline developed in Part One, Parts Two, Three and Four sought to illustrate empirically the ways in which broad cultural reference points – specifically narratives of technological development within and beyond the narrow field of military security – have been invoked by proponents to substantiate the (claimed) technological capabilities of missile defence and embellish its rationale as a component of US defence policy.