Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text and translation
- Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
- Preface
- Contents
- Part I Anthropological Didactic. On the way of cognizing the interior as well as the exterior of the human being
- Part II Anthropological Characteristic. On the way of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exterior
- Index
- Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Chronology
- Further reading
- Note on the text and translation
- Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
- Preface
- Contents
- Part I Anthropological Didactic. On the way of cognizing the interior as well as the exterior of the human being
- Part II Anthropological Characteristic. On the way of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exterior
- Index
- Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy
Summary
All cultural progress, by means of which the human being advances his education, has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and skill for the world's use. But the most important object in the world to which he can apply them is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. – Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knowledge of the world, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth.
A doctrine of knowledge of the human being, systematically formulated (anthropology), can exist either in a physiological or in a pragmatic point of view. – Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself. – He who ponders natural phenomena, for example, what the causes of the faculty of memory may rest on, can speculate back and forth (like Descartes) over the traces of impressions remaining in the brain, but in doing so he must admit that in this play of his representations he is a mere observer and must let nature run its course, for he does not know the cranial nerves and fibers, nor does he understand how to put them to use for his purposes.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006