As the above passage from Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone indicates, the doctrine of radical evil not only defines our moral condition but also sets the moral agenda for finite, imperfect beings such as ourselves, namely, to struggle to the best of our ability against an ineliminable reluctance to subordinate the requirements of our sensuous nature to the dictates of morality. Since this reluctance is ineliminable, we can never attain holiness; but since we can struggle against it and even succeed in the subordination of our sensuous to our moral selves, we are capable of virtue. Kant's account of virtue is complicated, however, by his insistence that although holiness is unobtainable, we have a duty to strive after it and, indeed, that this striving or commitment is an essential feature of a virtuous life. Accordingly, the present chapter, which completes our analysis of Kant's conception of moral agency, is divided into two parts. The first sketches Kant's conception of virtue and considers its connections with the theory of radical evil; the second analyzes the presumed connection between virtue and the pursuit of holiness and Kant's various attempts to explain how we can be morally required to pursue an unobtainable ideal.