Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Photographs
- Maps
- Tables
- Key to military symbols
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the text
- Glossary
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 Strategy
- Chapter 3 Military intelligence
- Chapter 4 The Nankai Shitai
- Chapter 5 From the landing to Deniki
- Chapter 6 Isurava
- Chapter 7 Guadalcanal and Milne Bay
- Chapter 8 The Japanese build-up
- Chapter 9 First Eora–Templeton’s
- Chapter 10 Efogi
- Chapter 11 Ioribaiwa
- Chapter 12 Japanese Artillery
- Chapter 13 Malaria and dysentery
- Chapter 14 The Japanese supply crisis
- Chapter 15 Second Eora–Templeton’s
- Chapter 16 Oivi–Gorari
- Chapter 17 The war in the air
- Chapter 18 Conclusion
- Note on sources
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 7 - Guadalcanal and Milne Bay
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Photographs
- Maps
- Tables
- Key to military symbols
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the text
- Glossary
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 Strategy
- Chapter 3 Military intelligence
- Chapter 4 The Nankai Shitai
- Chapter 5 From the landing to Deniki
- Chapter 6 Isurava
- Chapter 7 Guadalcanal and Milne Bay
- Chapter 8 The Japanese build-up
- Chapter 9 First Eora–Templeton’s
- Chapter 10 Efogi
- Chapter 11 Ioribaiwa
- Chapter 12 Japanese Artillery
- Chapter 13 Malaria and dysentery
- Chapter 14 The Japanese supply crisis
- Chapter 15 Second Eora–Templeton’s
- Chapter 16 Oivi–Gorari
- Chapter 17 The war in the air
- Chapter 18 Conclusion
- Note on sources
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As Horii was making a mess of his opportunity to destroy the Australians at Isurava, an order arrived from Hyakutake on 28 August, the import of which can hardly be overestimated. Horii was told that the offensive against Port Moresby was off, certainly for six weeks and probably for longer.
On 7 August United States Marines had landed at Guadalcanal and taken from the Japanese an airfield they were constructing there. At Rabaul the Japanese Seventeenth Army found itself with an interesting problem. If the American force at Guadalcanal was large, a division or so, then it had to be dealt with using reinforcements earmarked for Papua. If it was small, then it need not affect Papua. Tokyo was consulted and assumed the worst. Imperial Headquarters directed the movement of air, land and sea assets towards Guadalcanal via Rabaul. By 16 August it was clear that Imperial Headquarters was right, the Guadalcanal problem was definitely a large one – in fact 11000 United States Marines were already there – and Horii, still at Rabaul, was told that his attack on Port Moresby would be postponed. The official order confirming this arrived during the battle of Isurava.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Kokoda Campaign 1942Myth and Reality, pp. 84 - 94Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012