It is worth taking stock of the various respects in which Kuhn’s epistemology of science is aptly called an evolutionary epistemology, for, as we saw earlier, the term “evolutionary epistemology” does not identify a single, well-defined approach to epistemology.

In Part i, I argue that Kuhn believes there are genuine revolutionary changes in science. But, throughout Part ii, I have argued that Kuhn’s epistemology is an evolutionary epistemology. One might think there is a tension in Kuhn’s epistemology of science with his characterization of science in both evolutionary and revolutionary terms. The question is: can Kuhn have it both ways? Can an epistemology of science be both an evolutionary epistemology and also acknowledge that there are revolutionary changes in science? In answering this question I aim to clarify what in Kuhn’s epistemology is aptly characterized as revolutionary and what is aptly characterized as evolutionary.