The preceding chapters have found a commitment to legality in both the transition to – and from – apartheid. I have demonstrated that this commitment not only facilitated South Africa's transition to democracy, but also provided an important foundation for the legal system in that democracy. It is important to appreciate, as Arthur Chaskalson reminds us, that “[s]ome unjust societies lack any semblance of such a commitment. There was, strangely, a commitment to legality in apartheid South Africa, and that is what makes it such an unusual case.” Or does it?

Do we possess comparative evidence that would further support my argument about path dependence and the law? Tentative evidence in support of the argument can be gleaned from the case of Chile, 1830–1990. What follows is an individualizing comparison of Pinochet's endgame, with particular reference to the legacies of law. The analysis, however, is tentative and should not be construed as an attempt at universal generalization. The individualizing comparison offered here is different from an all-encompassing comparison. This chapter does not compare the experiences of the countries under scrutiny – South Africa and Chile – in any systemic fashion. Nor does it offer a real “test” of the model advanced in the preceding chapters. Rather, the overall analysis concentrates on the singularities of each case in an effort to bring the revived concept of the dual state into sharper focus.