It did not take the revolutionaries long to recognise that they had a problem with the line army that they inherited from the Bourbon monarchy, a problem which, even in 1789, manifested itself in a number of very different ways. The new regime could not assume the loyalty and commitment of its troops, and desertion rates soared, especially amongst officers who had taken a personal oath of fealty to the King and thought that their oath had been rendered irrelevant by the dramatic change in the polity. Many of the men in the ranks, too, became suspect in the eyes of the new government, since the authorities could not feel sure that they would obey orders when faced with a stream of countermanding political currents. Some were felt to be easily led and might follow their officers into counter-revolution or emigration; others could be intoxicated by the language of liberty and equality and lured into acts of indiscipline and mutiny. It could not be assumed, in other words, that the soldiers would remain obedient, carrying out without question the will of the new government, or that generals who had obeyed the orders of a sovereign king would now transfer their loyalty to the sovereign nation. The large number of resignations from high-ranking officers and the departure of many prominent military figures into emigration in Turin, Mainz and Coblenz added to the distrust which the revolutionaries felt for the officer class, while the violent mutinies at Nancy, Perpignan and elsewhere during 1790 fuelled fears that the line army could disintegrate, leaving Paris open to attack and the Revolution perilously vulnerable.