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Michael J. Zimmerman

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511481505.006

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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009

Michael J. Zimmerman

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Michael J. Zimmerman: Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

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Type: Chapter
Information: Living with Uncertainty
The Moral Significance of Ignorance
, pp. 206 - 213

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511481505.006 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2008

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