In this chapter we take up the issue of “methodological collectivism”and proceed to offer a criticism of its basic functionalist skeleton. I maintain the view that, when all is said and done, any collectivist theory is a variant of functional analysis, notwithstanding its special linguistic-conceptual transcription. I know of five basic versions of collectivist theory:

1. systems theory: This includes the model of the “general systems theory” (Mesarovic and Takahara 1989; Weinberg 1975) as well as the more specific theories of social systems. Parsons's work, no doubt, remains the locus classicus in sociology, while in political science a similar value is assigned to Karl Deutsch's work. More recently, Niklas Luhmann has reworked this model in more imaginative ways.

2. group differentiation theory: From its Spencerian and Durkhei-mian origins, the differentiationist model, which places the emphasis on increasing size and complexity, has been advanced in slightly varying directions by systems theorists (Luhmann), structural evolutionists (Lenski), neo-functionalists (Alexander and Colomy), and so-called structural analysts (American structuralists such as Blau and Mayhew).

3. structuralist theory: With roots in Saussure and the Bourbaki group (Gleick 1987; Halmos 1957) French structuralism –whether of the mentalist (Lévi-Strauss) or the sociologistic, Marxist variety (Althusser) – emerged as a collectivist version, the organizing principle of which was the construal of totalities on the basis of simple or complex binary oppositions.