Second, the title testifies to Machiavelli's attention to the reputation that attends virtue and vice, rather than the practice of the virtues and the avoidance of vices. By presenting virtue and vice as “things” (P 15) for which men are praised or blamed, he treats virtue as instrumental to opinion, rather than desirable for its own sake. Because praise and blame illuminate the virtues and vices, the latter are not inscrutable characteristics of one's soul, or evident in one's conduct toward others, but a form of popular moral shorthand that indicates others’ perception. In chapter 15, Machiavelli diminishes the moral force of this popular judgment by blurring the distinctions between virtues and vices. He accomplishes this dramatically by providing a convoluted list of paired “qualities that bring [men, and especially princes] either blame or praise” (P 15).

Someone is considered liberal, someone mean… ; someone is considered a giver, someone rapacious; someone cruel, someone merciful; the one a breaker of faith, the other faithful; the one effeminate and pusillanimous, the other fierce and spirited; the one humane, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one honest, the other astute; the one hard, the other agreeable; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other unbelieving, and the like. (P 15)