Nearly 190 national constitutions are in force today. More than half of them have been written or rewritten in the past three decades. Many of these constitutions begin with some version of the famous four words: “We the People of …” But the theoretical discussion of the role of that “We” in the process of constructing a constitution is surprisingly limited and narrow. The “We” issue is particularly problematic in the context of constitution-drafting in deeply divided societies. Where polities are still grappling with the very definition of their collectivity, crafting a formal democratic constitution that reflects shared norms and values is a daunting challenge. How can a constitution be created in the absence of societal consensus on the norms and values of the state? This challenge is the central question addressed in this book.

In recent years constitutions have become a leading tool for mitigating conflicts and promoting democracy in divided societies. From South Africa to Bosnia, great hopes have been placed in the potential contribution of the process of constitution-making to post-conflict peace and stability. However, under conditions of deep internal disagreement, enacting a formal constitution is a high-stakes game that can undermine political stability and derail democratization. Where intense polarization exists between competing visions of the state, drafting a constitution risks unleashing political crisis. This has recently been the case in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where the debate over the constitution revealed deep divisions among the framers with regard to foundational norms and values that should underpin the state.