We may distinguish between two kinds of substantivism: particularist substantivism and list-substantivism. In this chapter, I shall explain why I think we should favor particularist substantivism. This also enables me to complete the argument in favor of my thesis that morality does not need a non-moral justification. As I shall argue, the rejection of list-substantivism in favor of particularist substantivism gives us a reason to reject the assumption that morality needs a substantive non-moral justification. It should be emphasized that this chapter is not supposed to give an adequate defense of particularist substantivism. I shall indeed offer some arguments against list-substantivism. However, an adequate defense of particularist substantivism would require that I take up many issues which I have chosen to set aside. This work is already long enough. I have said plenty in defense of substantivism and the substantive approach. This final chapter is merely meant to indicate the direction in which one would have to go in the further development of these views.

TWO VERSIONS OF SUBSTANTIVISM

Substantivism maintains that actions are sometimes rational or irrational on account of substantive considerations rather than formal ones. According to one version of substantivism, there is a certain specifiable set of ends which it is rational to pursue or irrational to sacrifice. In other words, it is distinctive of this theory – which may be called “list-substantivism” – that the content on which the rationality of actions depends can be laid down in a list of possible ends or actions.