Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- I Action, freedom, responsibility
- II Philosophy, evolution, and the human sciences
- III Ethics
- 13 The point of view of the universe: Sidgwick and the ambitions of ethics
- 14 Ethics and the fabric of the world
- 15 What does intuitionism imply?
- 16 Professional morality and its dispositions
- 17 Who needs ethical knowledge?
- 18 Which slopes are slippery?
- 19 Resenting one's own existence
- 20 Must a concern for the environment be centred on human beings?
- 21 Moral luck: a postscript
- Index
17 - Who needs ethical knowledge?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- I Action, freedom, responsibility
- II Philosophy, evolution, and the human sciences
- III Ethics
- 13 The point of view of the universe: Sidgwick and the ambitions of ethics
- 14 Ethics and the fabric of the world
- 15 What does intuitionism imply?
- 16 Professional morality and its dispositions
- 17 Who needs ethical knowledge?
- 18 Which slopes are slippery?
- 19 Resenting one's own existence
- 20 Must a concern for the environment be centred on human beings?
- 21 Moral luck: a postscript
- Index
Summary
An old question, still much discussed in moral philosophy, is whether there is any ethical knowledge. It is closely related, by simple etymology, to the question of cognitivism in ethics. Despite the fact that the terms ‘cognitivism’ and ‘objectivism’ seem sometimes to be used interchangeably, I take it that the question whether there can be ethical knowledge is not the same as the question whether ethical outlooks can be objective. A sufficient reason for this is that an ethical outlook might be taken to consist of rules or principles, which do not admit of truth or falsehood and so cannot be objects of knowledge, but which can be seen as having an objective basis.
However that may be, it is usually thought that cognitivism is the form that objectivism should take if ethical claims can be true or false. Why should we think this? It may be said: if ethical claims can be true, then the most desirable state one can be in with regard to them is knowledge. By itself, that argument comes close to a simple assertion – it is, at least, very short. However, the argument may perhaps be given a rather richer content, on the following lines. A desirable state for one to be in with regard to one's ethical views is confidence. If one's state is not confidence, then it is doubt, and, at the limit, scepticism; and while it is certainly a good thing that people should be to some degree open to doubt about their ethical convictions, general doubt can hardly be desirable.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Making Sense of HumanityAnd Other Philosophical Papers 1982–1993, pp. 203 - 212Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1995
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