Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
9 - Organisational Expedients and Securing Access to Credit, 1628–88
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 February 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
There are two fundamentally important organisational expedients that Cardinal Richelieu pursued in the 1620s and 1630s which had long-term implications for the functioning of the naval treasury. First of all, as the self-styled grand maître, chef, et surintendant général de la navigation et du commerce de France, Richelieu established the principle of depending on a single trésorier. In order to expand Richelieu's control over the navy at the expense of local admiralties, and to rein in the independence of individual trésoriers, power was concentrated in favoured individuals in the naval treasury and efforts were made to accommodate their personal interests and ambitions. In 1628, the navy's need for reliable funding prompted Richelieu to allow François Le Conte, already a trésorier of the Extraordinaire des Guerres, to exercise de facto responsibility for funding the navy. Le Conte would eventually formally occupy all three offices of trésorier de la Marine du Ponant. The decision to rely on a single yet financially robust trésorier enabled the navy to handle unprecedented expenses of 4 million l. in 1628, which principally resulted from the blockade of the Huguenot stronghold at La Rochelle between December 1627 and November 1628. The extent to which Richelieu was willing to circumvent formal procedures in the service of the navy's interests was clear when the start of open conflict with Spain in 1635 caused the government to rush the closure of the navy's open and unfinished exercices. Scrutiny of Le Conte's états au vrai of 1631 to 1634 revealed pervasive levels of financial misappropriation, particularly at Brest, but the navy urgently needed its debts to be settled since naval preparations were required to respond to the Spanish capture of the Lérins islands off Cannes in September 1635, and to the subsequent threat posed by the enemy fleet to Toulon and Marseille. In response, Richelieu manipulated Le Conte's états au vrai to ensure that they would pass unobstructed through the Chambre des comptes of Paris, thus enabling the trésorier to focus on the navy's forthcoming financial needs. Through a strengthened Conseil de la marine, which began to oversee the activities of the trésoriers, Richelieu was therefore able to exert greater control over the naval treasury and to formalise its organisation according to his interests.
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- Maritime Power and the Power of Money in Louis XIV's FrancePrivate Finance, the Contractor State, and the French Navy, pp. 154 - 171Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2023