Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction: Losing Battles and Winning Wars
- 2 Prologue to Tragedy: U.S. Military Opposition to Intervention in Vietnam, 1950–1954
- 3 Preparing for and Avoiding War: Military Affairs and Politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955–1960
- 4 Pinning Down the President: JFK, the Military, and Political Maneuvering over Vietnam, January-October 1961
- 5 The Best and Worst of Times: The U.S. War against Vietnam, October 1961–November 1963
- 6 “Seeing Things Through in Vietnam”: LBJ, the Military, and the Growing U.S. Commitment to Vietnam, November 1963-December 1964
- 7 Hope for the Best, Expect the Worst: U.S. Ground Troops Enter the Vietnam War, January-July 1965
- 8 War on Three Fronts: U.S. Forces versus the Viet Cong, Westmoreland versus the Marines, and Military Leaders versus the White House, July 1965-December 1966
- 9 “The Platform of False Prophets Is Crowded”: Public Hope and Private Despair in Vietnam, 1967
- 10 The Myth of Tet: Military Failure and the Politics of War
- 11 Conclusion: Bringing It All Back Home
- Epilogue: “This Is a Real War”: Military Dissent and Politics after Vietnam
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - “Seeing Things Through in Vietnam”: LBJ, the Military, and the Growing U.S. Commitment to Vietnam, November 1963-December 1964
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction: Losing Battles and Winning Wars
- 2 Prologue to Tragedy: U.S. Military Opposition to Intervention in Vietnam, 1950–1954
- 3 Preparing for and Avoiding War: Military Affairs and Politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955–1960
- 4 Pinning Down the President: JFK, the Military, and Political Maneuvering over Vietnam, January-October 1961
- 5 The Best and Worst of Times: The U.S. War against Vietnam, October 1961–November 1963
- 6 “Seeing Things Through in Vietnam”: LBJ, the Military, and the Growing U.S. Commitment to Vietnam, November 1963-December 1964
- 7 Hope for the Best, Expect the Worst: U.S. Ground Troops Enter the Vietnam War, January-July 1965
- 8 War on Three Fronts: U.S. Forces versus the Viet Cong, Westmoreland versus the Marines, and Military Leaders versus the White House, July 1965-December 1966
- 9 “The Platform of False Prophets Is Crowded”: Public Hope and Private Despair in Vietnam, 1967
- 10 The Myth of Tet: Military Failure and the Politics of War
- 11 Conclusion: Bringing It All Back Home
- Epilogue: “This Is a Real War”: Military Dissent and Politics after Vietnam
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Some say we should withdraw from South Viet-Nam, that we have lost almost 200 lives there in the last four years and we should come home. But the United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to communist tyranny.
Lyndon Baines JohnsonAs Lyndon Johnson moved into the Oval Office, U.S. policy in Vietnam was in disarray. The events of November 1963 had undermined the optimistic claims of Harkins, Taylor, and others, and the enemy was successfully exploiting the political crisis in the south. Despite those problems, the new president would not deviate from the path that Kennedy had established. With over 16,000 military personnel already deployed, the United States had made a substantial commitment to the RVN, and the American presence would grow exponentially in the coming years. In the course of his first year in the Oval Office, Johnson would authorize covert operations, approve a massive bombing campaign against the DRVN, and prepare to introduce ground combat troops into the conflict. By early 1965, despite many military leaders' reservations, the United States was about to take over the war in Vietnam.
During the first year of his presidency, Johnson expanded the U.S. presence in Vietnam with clear recognition of the deteriorating conditions in the south and the hazards of intervention there. Like Kennedy, however, he believed that political factors, both at home and internationally, made it imperative to continue to protect the RVN.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Masters of WarMilitary Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era, pp. 153 - 186Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996