Book contents
- Frontmatter
- CONTENTS
- Acknowledgements
- List of Maps and Tables
- Abbreviations
- Author's Note
- Maps
- Introduction
- Part I
- 1 The Loss of Burma, January–May 1942
- 2 India's Readiness for War in the East, May 1942
- Part II
- Part III
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 The British Army Supply System, 1942
- Appendix 2 Outline Order of Battle of the Burma Garrison, 20 January 1942
- Appendix 3 Outline Order of Battle of the Allied Burma Army, 19 March 1942
- Appendix 4 Illustration of Ordnance Factory Output, Years Ending March 1940, March 1942 and March 1944
- Appendix 5 Extract from 14th Army Operational Research Report No. 24
- Appendix 6 Outline SEAC Forces, December 1943
- Appendix 7 Operation STAMINA: Airlift of Army Stocks to IV Corps at Imphal
- Appendix 8 Outline ALFSEA and CCTF Forces, January 1945
- Notes
- Works Cited
- Index
2 - India's Readiness for War in the East, May 1942
from Part I
- Frontmatter
- CONTENTS
- Acknowledgements
- List of Maps and Tables
- Abbreviations
- Author's Note
- Maps
- Introduction
- Part I
- 1 The Loss of Burma, January–May 1942
- 2 India's Readiness for War in the East, May 1942
- Part II
- Part III
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 The British Army Supply System, 1942
- Appendix 2 Outline Order of Battle of the Burma Garrison, 20 January 1942
- Appendix 3 Outline Order of Battle of the Allied Burma Army, 19 March 1942
- Appendix 4 Illustration of Ordnance Factory Output, Years Ending March 1940, March 1942 and March 1944
- Appendix 5 Extract from 14th Army Operational Research Report No. 24
- Appendix 6 Outline SEAC Forces, December 1943
- Appendix 7 Operation STAMINA: Airlift of Army Stocks to IV Corps at Imphal
- Appendix 8 Outline ALFSEA and CCTF Forces, January 1945
- Notes
- Works Cited
- Index
Summary
By the time the Japanese arrived on her eastern borders in the spring of 1942 India was beginning to resemble a chipped and dusty jewel in a dented imperial crown. She was economically backward, socially stressed, vulnerable to nationalist political instability and already suffering under the demands made upon her to support the war against the European axis, which was not going well. Moreover, her traditional defence posture and military culture left her ill-prepared to face the unexpected threat from the east and a new war in which she was both front line and strategic base. There was sparkle still, though, deep in the jewel, and it was made of hard stuff. Like the dented crown, the jewel would shine in the end.
The Indian Economy
There is little doubt that India had considerable economic potential at the start of the Second World War. With a population of some 400 million she had a huge workforce, which, given adequate education, training and working conditions, could do much for the war effort. She had substantial stocks of strategically important raw materials and the makings of industries needed to sustain the war, even if they were then small, unsophisticated and lacking up-to-date efficiency. At that time, however, the development of the Indian economy was retarded in relation to the industrialized nations of the west and other comparable eastern countries, particularly Japan. India's was a largely peasant-based agrarian structure with an average annual per capita income of a barely credible 60 rupees – about £4 10s. at the time. The standard of education of most of the workforce was low and there was a widespread lack of trade skills. In Japan successive governments since the modernization period of the nineteenth century had taken an active role in driving the development of industry and commerce so they were well advanced and suitably prepared to participate in the sort of command-style economic culture necessary for the prosecution of total war.
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- Publisher: Pickering & ChattoFirst published in: 2014