The essays in this volume were written over a period of twenty-two years. The first six essays reflect the traditional concern of legal philosophy with the nature of law, especially law's relation to moral principle. The remaining essays address problems and emerging issues of legal interpretation.

If this volume has a dominant theme, it is a lack of reverence for the law. The law to which I refer is not some sanitized ideal but rather what counts as law in real legal systems. As far as I can see, those bodies of law have merely contingent, indeed fragile, links with justice.

My attitude toward law is not derived from theory. It was kindled by a clash between reasonable ideals and harsh realities. Growing up during a war against fascism, one naturally acquired ideals of democracy and political decency. But it was dangerous to act on those ideals in the succeeding decade, when law was placed in the service of political repression while it continued to sustain practices of racial and sexual domination.

My sense of law's fallibility was confirmed by some knowledge of its record. Far more often than not, law has served oppressive, unjust, inhumane social arrangements.

Of course, American law has also served as a means of emancipation. In recent decades, law has helped to honor the constitutional promise of justice and liberty. That is why law should be seen not as inherently evil but as available for service to injustice as well as justice.