Moral status is a characteristic that we human moral agents attribute to entities, by virtue of which they matter morally for their own sake, so that we must pay attention to their interests or integrity when we consider actions that might affect them, regardless of whether other beings are concerned about them. When an entity has moral status, I may not act toward it in any way I please, disregarding its well-being, preferences, or continued existence. I owe some moral obligations to that entity itself. As a moral agent, I must care to some degree about what it wants or needs, or simply what it is; this imposes some limitations on how I may act toward it. This is importantly different from having obligations in relation to some entity (e.g., my neighbor's house) that are actually owed to some other entity (i.e., my neighbor). It is the being to whom duties are owed that has moral status. Moral status is also importantly different from moral goodness; persons' intentional conformity to moral principles might be one of the characteristics that enhances their moral status, relative to persons who routinely act immorally and to beings who are incapable of moral action, but being worthy of consideration in others' moral reasoning is quite distinct conceptually from acting morally oneself.

Because moral status gives rise to moral obligations, what moral status different beings occupy is crucial to all of social existence and to every area of law.