INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I propose, and then attempt to ground, a standard of practical rationality. According to this standard, to a first approximation, rationality consists in the efficient pursuit of what one values. This standard differs from the familiar principle of instrumental reason, which requires us to take the most efficient means to our ends, for it gives special emphasis to those of our ends that qualify as our values. It also differs from the principle of self-interest, which requires us to pursue our own good, both because we might value the good of others as much as our own good, and because, if we are unwise, we might value things that are bad for ourselves. I speak of the conception of rationality I develop as “self-grounded” because it requires the pursuit of a person's own values, and also because, as I shall argue, a person's values are grounded in her identity, on one useful conception of the identity of persons.

The idea of grounding a standard of rationality will require some discussion. The term comes from Immanuel Kant, as does my strategy, broadly understood, for I aim to ground the standard of self-grounded reason in the idea of autonomous agency, which of course is a strategy inspired by Kant's work in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The account I shall give of autonomous agency is very different from Kant's, however, and my conception of rationality is modest by comparison with a Kantian conception.